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As this potentially final instalment of The Euro-Files
appears, the campaign around the referendum on
the UK’s membership of the EU is now well under
way. It has so far proved every bit as uninspired and
depressing as it promised to be. Debate seems for
the most part mired in conflicting views on the
contested issues of immigration and the economic
advantages of being in, or leaving, the EU.
Boris Johnson has stepped forward as the
Brexiters’ ‘man of the hour’, indulged by a media
that is only belatedly starting to scrutinise his
pronouncements and actions.1 The ‘Remain’
campaign for its part has been lacklustre, struggling
to break out of a defensive position to articulate a
positive vision of Europe and what the UK gains
from being in the EU. Rather, it has relied largely on
doom-laden warnings of what may be lost if we
leave. This has made it all too easy for the ‘Leavers’,
with the help of a largely compliant media, to paint
it as ‘Project Fear’.
The irony is that the Leave campaign is based on
manipulating and stoking people’s fears of change in
an uncertain world, notably surrounding immigration
and security issues. The referendum campaign has
hardly touched upon key aspects of the UK’s
membership of the EU and areas of shared European
action such as the environment (see the article by
Cowell and Owens elsewhere in this issue).
It seems that a ‘national conversation’ on Europe
has barely started – certainly nothing to compare to
the debate during the Scottish independence
referendum of 2014. Meanwhile, Europe is grappling
with real challenges such as the migrant crisis and
continuing economic problems for which Britain 
has largely abnegated any share of collective
responsibility. In short, to recall Richard Hoggart’s
evocation of An Idea of Europe,2 there seems to be
no trace of any version of this in the current debate.
Moreover, there is an the assumption that there is
a monolithic ‘UK interest’ in relation to the EU. Yet
the UK is a highly diverse state culturally and
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economically, a fact that has been recognised and
responded to by devolution over recent decades.
This diversity means that different places in the 
UK may have their own more specific ‘territorial
interest’ as regards the EU which may align with, 
or diverge from, that of the wider UK.
One area which has received scant attention is
the EU’s regional policy (Cohesion Policy). As well
as being of relevance to planning and economic
development, this policy area provides a typical case
of how a Member State’s experience of the EU and
the impact of specific EU actions emerges from the
interaction of EU agendas and goals and domestic
conditions, objectives and policy settings.
The emergence of European regional policy –
another British contribution?
The fundamental question underpinning regional
and regeneration policy has often been stated as
being whether public action should seek to ‘bring
the people to the work; or the work to the people’.
The former option may imply allowing, encouraging
or facilitating migration of populations to places of
growth, economic opportunity and employment,
while the second might justify active state policy
and investment to encourage growth in places that
have lost economic momentum and face problems
of structural change and unemployment.
Britain has long pursued some form of regional
policy to try to foster more equal levels of opportunity
and economic development between its regions.3
This has been an issue of varying concern to
different UK governments down to the present day,
and initiatives such as the ‘Northern Powerhouse’,
with its aspiration to close the productivity gap
between the North and South of England by
encouraging growth across the larger northern 
city-regions.4 Over the decades, UK regional policy
has typically sought to address the structural
industrial and employment issues facing regions
which became heavily industrialised from the 
19th century onwards.
By the 1970s, notably following the oil crisis of
1973, many of these regions and their communities
were facing the full effects of economic restructuring.
This was manifested in rising levels of unemployment
and physical changes such as the emergence of
derelict post-industrial landscapes and the neglect
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and degradation of living environments. Many areas
continued to face such challenges into the 1980s
and beyond.
Meanwhile, other major European countries such
as France and West Germany were still enjoying
relative prosperity in the 1970s, with lower levels of
unemployment and high levels of GDP per capita
compared with the UK.
This was the context in which the UK joined the
then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973.
The creation of an EEC regional policy had been
discussed for some time, but the UK joining provided
an added impetus to its development.5 As well as
having its own tradition of regional policy, the idea
of developing an EEC equivalent appealed to the UK
as a means of ensuring a larger direct return on its
contribution to the EEC budget. This was because
the UK was not expected to benefit as much as
certain other states from the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP), having a different economic structure
and set of regional development issues.
The creation of the European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF) in the mid-1970s was thus a product of
the UK working with certain other EEC Member
States (notably Ireland and Italy). It was an early
example of how engaging with other countries within
the EEC could produce results and outcomes which
could benefit the UK – in this case its economically
struggling regions and their communities.
What have the European Structural Funds ever
done for us?
The emergence of a European regional policy and
the ‘Structural Funds’ that supported it was thus
significant to the UK, which at the time was facing
dramatic economic change. Economic restructuring
impacted particularly on areas and communities
highly dependent on ‘traditional’ manufacturing
sectors, especially in areas of northern and western
Britain which were shouldering a disproportionate
share of the social, economic, environmental and
cultural costs of the Thatcher era.
However, it was not simply its role in supporting
measures to respond to the effects of economic
change ‘on the ground’ that made European regional
policy so significant at the time. The broad ‘social
democratic consensus’ of the postwar years had
given way to the rise of neoliberal influence on 
the state and public policy. This advocated less 
state spending and intervention to address the
consequences of economic and social change.
Economic turbulence, mass unemployment and
urban unrest in the 1980s reinforced the emergence
of ‘urban regeneration’ as a major policy field which
sought to address urban ‘problems’, typically in
what Margaret Thatcher famously described as
‘those inner cities’.6 Urban policy was increasingly
dominated by central government, which privileged
an increased role for the private sector as scepticism
towards public action led to local government being
marginalised in the urban regeneration process.
In some circles of government there was talk of
‘managed decline’ for major urban areas such as
Liverpool7 – an idea that postwar UK governments
of any political hue would have found unacceptable
prior to the neoliberal ascendancy of the 1970s and
1980s. Crucially, it remained unacceptable to a
number of key actors both in the UK and at the
highest levels within European institutions. Regional
policy was, in fact, largely sustained as an idea and
financially – notably after 1989 – by the EEC.
Interestingly, those Conservatives who domestically
advocated more attention and resources for
regeneration – notably Michael Heseltine – were
also among the most pro-European members of a
party which was commencing its long and debilitating
obsession with Euroscepticism. The corrosive ‘civil
war’ over Europe within the Tory ranks at the time
distracted attention from issues such as the effects
on working class communities of Thatcherite
economic and social experimentation. In contrast,
EU funding programmes were stepping in to
provide opportunity and hope to communities
(through, for example, initiatives such as RECHAR,
which provided EU support to communities affected
by pit closures).
In the early 1990s, the shocking truth was revealed
that some areas of the UK such as Merseyside
were now eligible for the highest level of European
regional policy support (called ‘Objective 1’). This
was available to regions whose GDP per head was
below 75% of the European average – regions
normally to be found in the relatively less prosperous
countries of the EEC such as Ireland, Greece, Spain
or Portugal.
The regional consequences of the Thatcher period
were stark and could not be masked completely by
the wider return to growth of the 1990s. Although
the UK had one of the largest economies in what
was now (after 1993) called the EU, it also had
some of the most significant regional disparities.
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Through the 1990s, EU Structural Fund support
had significant effects, helping to regenerate the
physical environment and ameliorate social conditions
in areas like Merseyside. The requirements of EU
Cohesion Policy, such as the need to ‘match fund’
projects and manage Structural Fund programmes,
also obliged national government to think about how
it would deliver regeneration. New institutions such
as Regional Government Offices were created in
part to oversee EU regional programmes and played
a role in tailoring policy to regional needs and
feeding back such needs to Whitehall. Other
principles of EU funding, such as partnership
working, helped to build governance capacity, and
the fact it operated over a six-yearly budgetary cycle
gave longer-term certainty about resources, which
facilitated project planning and delivery.
Following the arrival of New Labour in power, and
into the 2000s, EU Structural Fund priorities and
programmes dovetailed well with national initiatives
and objectives such as the ‘urban renaissance’ 
and social inclusion and neighbourhood renewal.
Against a backdrop of generally rising prosperity 
EU Structural Funds played a role in fostering faster
growth in some previously ‘lagging’ areas, such as
Merseyside, South Yorkshire, and the Highlands and
Islands. This helped them to begin to emerge from
‘lagging’ status as their GDP per head figures
gradually converged with the EU-15 average.
The entry of less prosperous nations into the EU
in the mid-2000s also had a significant impact, here
due to the so-called ‘statistical effect’ – this meant
that the average level of GDP per head in the EU
fell, making UK regions which had previously been
among the poorest in the EU seem comparatively
more prosperous. Regional disparities were now
much greater in the new EU of 28 rather than 15
states, and Structural Fund support for UK regions
declined overall (although it actually rose in Cornwall
and the Isles of Scilly).8
The symbolic and political value of EU Structural
Funds and the opportunities they opened up for
empowerment of local decision-makers and
communities was also important. Access to EU
funding and the European stage enabled some
cities and communities to regain the sense of worth
and value which was stripped from them in the
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national context in the latter decades of the 20th
century. The renaissance of cities such as Liverpool
cannot be attributed solely to EU programmes; but if
the idea that major cities in the north of England can
be described as international centres, ‘Powerhouses’,
or ‘European Cultural Capitals’ can no longer be
scoffed at by a London-centric media and political
elite, then the EU Structural Funds are at least partly
responsible.
The ability of cities and regions to engage in
‘three-way’ negotiation with central government 
and the EU Commission gave new leverage for
place-based development to local politicians and
communities. In many places assisted by EU
programmes such benefits seem to be recognised
by support for continued EU membership (for
example, online polling for the Liverpool Echo
shows around 60% of respondents in favour of
remaining in the EU).9
Where does EU Cohesion Policy ‘fit’ today?
The EU Structural Funds have traditionally reflected
the social wing of the EU project and have often
come under pressure from its more economically
liberal elements and wealthier EU Member States
who wish to minimise their contributions to the EU
budget.
Arguments are also heard that ‘place-based’
regional policy and regeneration does not really
work and simply diverts scarce resources from
places where they could be spent with more impact
and return. This echoes views heard in the UK10
that there are places that have simply outlived their
economic purpose and should be allowed to wither
as their populations move out and move on. EU
Structural Funds have traditionally sought to counter
this kind of market fatalism, although in the post-
2008 context they, too, have increasingly had to
justify themselves in terms of their contribution to
growth and competitiveness agendas.11
As the EU referendum debate in the UK
continues to be dominated by issues such as
immigration and simplistic calculations of precisely
how much is paid into, and returns directly to the
UK from, the EU budget, it is worth noting another
effect of EU regional and regeneration funds.
In helping to promote place-based territorial
development in some the less economically
developed parts of the EU, they help to bring some
‘work to the people’. Therefore, as well as being a
morally justifiable act of solidarity with less-
developed regions, such investment also brings
greater opportunities to people in situ – where they
are, helping to moderate and stabilise migration
flows towards the richer EU Member States.12
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EU structural and regeneration funds therefore play
a role in addressing some of the apparent concerns
of eurosceptics even when they are not spent
directly in the UK.13
An idea of Europe, and an idea of planning
There are many who see the EU as a conspiracy –
a nascent socialist ‘superstate’ for some; a neoliberal
plot for others. In truth, the EU reflects the world in
which it is evolves. It has the same liberalising
orientation as many governments around the world,
which also permeates the attitudes of a vast array 
of institutions and individuals, not just some EU
policies and legislation.14
But there is also ‘an idea’ or ‘version’ of the EU
that stands for other values, many of which cohere
with components of a progressive ‘idea of planning’
which may be held by many in the planning and
built environment professions. EU action has sought
to bolster environmental values and a European social
model which fosters the rights to equal territorial
opportunity of communities and individuals.
This is the story of EU structural and regeneration
funds in the UK. For all the frustration which its
contradictory positions generate, the EU is still a
body that devotes a third of its (modest, in relative
terms15) budget to upholding the principle that
‘people should not be disadvantaged by wherever
they happen to live or work in the Union’ – a
fundamental territorial expression of the principle of
social democracy. It is also a project which in its
roots is voluntaristic and anti-fatalistic, sharing with
the planning enterprise the quality of, in Nigel
Taylor’s words, ‘intervening in the world to protect
or change it in some way – to make it other than it
would otherwise be’.
For all their limitations, both planning and the
‘European Project’ arose from a very mid-20th
century belief that the power of reason and a
concern for social justice could be embedded into
collective action to ‘make the world a better place’.
This may appear a quaint notion in a contemporary
Britain where Boris Johnson can take to the
airwaves and openly compare the goals of the EU
to those of Adolf Hitler. An idea of Europe may be
all but dead in Britain, and the uncertain prospects
for the idea of planning are frequently discussed in
these pages, but it is perhaps Britain’s idea of itself
which is really at stake on 23 June 2016.
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